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Against a background in which the 
United States is increasingly drawing 
into question its commitments to free 
trade and the global commons, the 
challenge for the EU and China is to deal 
with a global governance system that is 
evolving from a multilateral system 
centred around the US into a more 
diffuse system resting on the three strong 
trading poles: China, the EU and the US.   
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The EU and China both have an interest in 
supporting an open multilateral trading system. 
They are very much in the same boat as both 
have to deal with formidable challenges in their 
domestic environment. The EU faces daunting 
challenges to revitalize the economy, create 
jobs, overcome extremism and cope with a 
large wave of refugees from a chaotic 
neighbourhood. China needs to come to terms 
with slowing economic development and at the 
same time ensure sustainable development and 
protect the environment. In the final analysis, 
this is a domestic political responsibility, but in 
a world of complex interdependence it can 
only be successfully taken up in a stable and 
predictable international environment. The 
question is whether the EU and China are 
willing to jointly support the multilateral 
system as the US steps back from its 
hegemonic role and, if so, whether they can 
act in a coordinated manner as the EU and the 
US have done in the past. 
 
DIFFERENCES  
This is not a trivial question because the EU 
and China differ much more from each other 
politically, economically, and socially, than do 
the EU and US. At the end of the day, the EU 
and China have very different identities and 
their relationship reveals deep-seated 
conceptual differences concerning norms, 
visions of power and governance, modes of 
international engagement and the organization 
of the emerging world order (Geeraerts 2011; 
Michalski and Pan 2018). The EU is an union 
of nation-states, a hybrid collective actor, 
which to this very day has the highest level of 
integration among all associations of states. As 
a substantially post-sovereign union, it 
welcomes mutual interference in domestic 
affairs, major transfers of sovereignty and 
strong rules-based international institutions in 
governing world affairs. In contrast, China is 
the largest sovereignist state in the world, 
which regards a strong sovereign state as a 
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guarantor of its national independence and a 
precondition for national ‘rejuvenation’. As a 
result, China prioritizes the defence of state 
sovereignty and non-interference in domestic 
affairs, and prefers international cooperation 
based on intergovernmental consensus rather 
than the pooling of sovereignty under the 
heading of supranational governance.  
 
The EU and China also have different 
political, economic and social systems, which 
leads “the two players to view the best way to 
manage domestic governance differently, and 
also creates problems in EU-China co-
operation in their efforts to shape the outside 
world. Europe in general has embraced 
political liberalism, seeing democracy, 
competitive elections, press freedom, vibrant 
civil society and human rights as basic 
components of internal good governance. In 
China, with its strong statist tradition and a 
twentieth-century revolution led by the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), a party-
state has been in place since the founding of 
the PRC. Its political system prioritizes party 
leadership in the society” (Chen 2016: 784). 
Since Deng’s market reform and open-door 
policy, the party became a driving force of 
China’s modernization and economic 
development.  
 
SIGNS OF CONVERGENCE  
In light of the important differences between 
the EU and China, the crucial question is how 
the two players can possibly jointly support 
and reshape the multilateral system. 
Interestingly, Chen (2016: 788-89) points to 
two developments that are facilitating 
convergence between the EU and China in 
their order-shaping efforts and could lead to a 
more concerted relationship in the future.  
 
The first is the return of the developmental 
agenda in Europe and the move beyond 
developmentalism in China. With their 
advanced technology and economic 
competitiveness, European countries have 
developed high-level welfare systems and have 
come to place more emphasis on quality-of-life 
issues. However, the sovereign debt crisis and 
the subsequent problems faced by many EU 
countries have pushed growth and 
development back to the top of the agenda in 
the EU. As a result, the EU is becoming more 
modern, less post-modern and more like other 
countries in the world. Meanwhile, China is 
moving beyond developmentalism “to 
deemphasize growth and focus more on 
quality-of-life issues. For example, given the 
unbearable level of heavy smog hanging over 
major Chinese cities, the Chinese government 
is now under heavy domestic pressure to speed 
up the process of improving energy efficiency 
and expand the use of clean energy” (Chen 
2016: 789). These mutually converging 
tendencies are narrowing preference 
differences between the EU and China, while 
at the same time creating the boundary 
conditions for a better concerted relationship 
on a wide range of bilateral and multilateral 
issues. 
  
The second development is the new 
pragmatism in Europe and growing globalism 
in China. Facing internal problems and a 
turbulent neighbourhood, the EU is 
preoccupied with finding solutions to internal 
growth and cohesion problems, as well as the 
task of stabilizing its neighbourhood. As a 
result, the EU “is becoming more pragmatic in 
its drive to transform the rest of the world and 
its relations with China. European countries all 
agreed to the 2010 IMF reform, which allowed 
some voting rights to be transferred mostly 
from Europe to China and other emerging 
countries. Trade disputes such as the solar 
panel disputes, though initially very 
confrontational, were eventually solved 
through a constructive compromise.  
 
Upon the deadline of 30 March 2015, 14 of the 
28 EU Member States decided to be founding 
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members of the China-sponsored Asian 
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), 
disregarding the explicit initial opposition from 
the United States government” (Chen 2016: 
789). This is a most important development as 
the AIIB can serve as a model for concerted 
order-shaping. Substantially inspired by 
European experience and expertise, this new 
institution sets high standards for its 
procedures. Public tenders for AIIB-financed 
projects must be transparent, non-
discriminatory and based on international 
standards. As such its principles can offer a 
guideline for infrastructure projects under the 
umbrella of the Belt and Road Initiative.  
 
Lastly, the EU’s new Global Strategy appears 
to suggest that “unless they undergo structural 
reforms to better reflect the changed world 
order, the traditional international financial 
institutions (TFI’s) risk losing their unique 
status as agenda-shapers in their respective 
domains” (Ujvari 2016: 2). In all evidence, the 
EU is coming to terms with the fact that, 
having grown disenchanted with the slow pace 
of reforms in the IMF, World Bank, and 
WTO, emerging powers – with China in the 
driver seat – have become more proactive in 
their attempts to step up their sway in 
international affairs and that the time has 
come for constructive adaptation of extant 
global governance structures.  
  
Meanwhile, Chinese foreign policy has taken a 
more globalist orientation, and the country is 
now prepared to take on greater responsibility 
internationally. A crucial step in this regard 
was taken in 2005 “when China endorsed the 
World Summit document which embraced the 
idea of ‘responsibility to protect’, indicating 
that China is willing to accept that certain 
crimes committed at home are not immune to 
international intervention, which implies a 
loosening of its rigid view of state sovereignty. 
China has also supported a number of UNSC 
resolutions under Chapter 7 of the UN 
Charter, which include coercive measures such 
as sanctions and military interventions” (Chen 
2016: 789).  
 
But most importantly, Xi Jinping is slowly but 
surely walking the talk on opening up China’s 
economy and paying tribute to his recently 
assumed role as the prime advocate for 
economic openness and international 
cooperation. Indeed, there are signs that the 
Chinese economy is gradually shifting in the 
direction of a new growth model, one that is 
more consumption oriented and driven by 
expansion in the services sector. The 2018 
Shanghai Import Expo was a timely reminder 
to the world of the rising importance of 
China’s expanding consumer economy. China’s 
household consumer market has grown tenfold 
from US$480 billion in 2000 to US$5.2 trillion 
in 2017. Further growth of US$1.8 trillion is 
predicted by 2021, which is equivalent to the 
entire German consumer market (Dodwell 
2018).  
 
Moreover, the World Bank recently has 
provided endorsement of China’s claim of 
steadily opening up. Its annual Doing Business 
study – an authoritative and rigorous 
assessment of the barriers that block access to 
the world’s markets – reports that China now 
ranks 46th out of 190 economies worldwide 
(World Bank 2018). While still reflecting 
substantial barriers in terms of market access, it 
compares with a ranking of 78th in 2017 and 
highlights intensive efforts in eliminating red 
tape for setting up a business. In the eyes of 
China’s major competitors this might be too 
slow, but it nevertheless represents substantial 
progress. At the end of the day, pushing 
through deep economic restructuring is not 
only in China’s interest, as it will create 
avenues for sustainable domestic growth, it will 
also augur well for the global economy. For 
Europe an expanding Chinese domestic 
market raises the prospect of new export and 
investment opportunities for its business, thus 
creating possibilities for alleviating the EU’s 
trade deficit with China and shaping the 
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settings for a more balanced trade relationship. 
An important next step towards this end 
would be the successful conclusion of the 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement. 
 
CONNECTIVITY  
All in all, some modest signs of mutual 
accommodation and convergence between the 
EU and China in their efforts to adapt 
themselves to the changing international 
system appear to be unfolding. As they both 
have a keen interest in a sound management of 
the evolving decentred multilateral order, the 
EU and China have ample reason to explore 
concerted efforts to provide individual and 
joint contributions to the general global public 
good. The challenge for the two of them is to 
build on their past successes and make 
themselves greater contributors to a more 
peaceful, prosperous and just world at large.  
 
Especially the EU-China Connectivity 
Platform offers a concrete possibility to 
engage in mutually beneficial projects of 
infrastructure construction, which would not 
only open up new ground for EU–China 
cooperation, but also offer the opportunity for 
the two to join forces to promote stability and 
development in the vast areas in the Eurasian 
continent between them. The Connectivity 
Platform can be viewed as an experiment in 
reciprocal socialization based on a sustained 
negotiation process. So far, the meetings of 
the Platform have enabled progress on: (1) 
policy exchange and alignment on the 
principles and the priorities in fostering 
transport connections between the EU and 
China, based on the Trans-European Network 
(TEN) and the Belt and Road initiative, and 
involving relevant third countries; (2) 
cooperation on promoting solutions at the 
international level with a focus on green 
transport solutions; and (3) concrete projects 
based on agreed criteria including 
sustainability, transparency, inclusiveness, and 
a level-playing field.  
 
Whilst it is clear that substantive results will 
take time to materialize, it is the process itself 
that is important. Over time, as analyses and 
viewpoints evolve and become increasingly 
aligned, and successful cooperative projects 
start bearing fruit, participants on both sides 
are more likely to gravitate toward consensus 
and step up their engagement in concerted 
order-shaping. Globally, more convergence in 
their preferences would lead to a stronger 
concerted order-shaping partnership. 
 
CONCLUSION 
With the boundary conditions of their 
relationship shifting, cooperation between 
China and the EU has become anything but 
easier. While they have many interests in 
common, they are also competitors within the 
confines of a multilateral system under stress. 
Building a sustainable strategic partnership will 
not come easy. Growing concerns about 
economic security as well as fundamental 
differences in their respective identities and 
societal systems will continue to pose 
challenges on the road to concerted order-
shaping, and policymakers on both sides will 
need to engage in reciprocal socialization if 
they are to overcome them. Some modest 
signs of mutual accommodation and 
convergence between the EU and China 
appear to be unfolding.  
 
While still at an embryonic stage, this is a 
crucial development. The partnership between 
the EU and China constitutes an important 
component in the reconfiguration of the world 
order triggered by the rise of the emerging 
powers. Its significance lies not only in 
connecting two key order-shapers in today’s 
world, but also in the management of the 
antagonistic quality of the relationship between 
actors with such different identities. At the 
heart of their - at times acrimonious - 
relationship lie deep-seated conceptual 
differences concerning norms, visions of 
society, modes of international engagement 
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and the organization of the emerging world 
order. The extent to which the EU and China 
can bridge these deep-seated differences is 
decisive not only for their continued mutual 
engagement, but also for the future 
development of the international system as the 
new world order will be premised on 
accommodating actors with significantly 
different normative outlook 
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